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1 For an interesting discussion, see A Hamman and R Koen, ‘Cave Pecuniam: Lawyers as 
Launderers’ [2012] PER 49.
2 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharif Case 11805-2018 (Solicitors Disciplinary 
Tribunal, 2019).
3 It must be emphasised that the establishment of such companies is entirely lawful. As 
noted below, it is the requirement that a solicitor addresses the risk as to whether such 
transactions are to be used for money laundering purposes that was in issue in the 
Sharif case.
Legal practitioners enjoy a high degree of credibility and trust. With this comes 
vulnerability. For example, a solicitor’s trust account may be used by criminals 
through which to launder their proceeds of crime.1 The need to maintain public 
confidence in the profession remains of paramount importance and it follows that 
substantial reputational harm can occur where there is a risk that legal practition-
ers are being used (wittingly or otherwise) to facilitate money laundering.
The January 2019 ruling of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in Solicitors 
Regulation Authority (the Applicant) v Sharif (the Respondent)2 highlights the 
care that legal practitioners must take in order to satisfy their anti-money 
laundering (AML) obligations and the serious consequences of any failure to do 
so. It also throws light on the use made of the notorious Panama-based law firm 
Mossack Fonseca in establishing offshore companies as vehicles for purchasing 
real estate in the United Kingdom (UK) and thus concealing the beneficial 
ownership of the property.3
This note provides a background to the anti-money laundering (AML) 
obligations of legal practitioners, examines the decision in the Sharif case itself 
and then discusses some of the key issues raised.
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THE AML OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL PRACTITIONERS
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations4 contain a series of 
well-known money laundering preventive measures. These apply both to financial 
institutions and to ‘designated non-financial businesses and professions’5 
(DNFBPs), a term that includes lawyers, notaries and other independent legal 
professionals. For example, Recommendation 10 requires these bodies to under-
take a series of customer due diligence (CDD) measures that include know your 
customer (KYC) requirements, e.g. verifying the identity of the customer and 
beneficial owner before or during the course of establishing a business relationship 
or conducting transactions for occasional customers.
In doing so, the FATF Recommendations emphasise that countries must 
require financial institutions and DNFBPs to adopt a risk-based approach to 
mitigate their money laundering and terrorist financing risks.6 Politically exposed 
persons (PEPs) are recognised as posing a heightened money laundering risk. A 
PEP is defined as:
i. A person who is or has, at any time in the preceding year, been entrusted with 
a prominent public function by a state other than the UK; an EU institution; or 
an international body;
ii. An immediate family member of anyone listed in (i) above;
iii. A known close associate of anyone listed in (i) above.7
The FATF has noted that ‘due to their position and influence, it is recognised that 
many PEPs are in positions that potentially can be abused for the purposes of 
committing money laundering offences and related predicate offences, including 
corruption and bribery’.8 Thus when entering or maintaining business relation-
ships with PEPs enhanced due diligence (EDD) measures are required. These are 
purely preventive in nature and do not ‘stigmatise PEPs as being involved in crim-
inal activity’.9
4 The FATF is an intergovernmental body with a mandate, inter alia, to set standards for 
combating money laundering. These are set through the Financial Action Task Force, 
‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
& Proliferation’ (FATF, 2012, updated 2018) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/
fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html> accessed 10 June 2019.
5 Ibid., Recommendation 5.
6 Ibid., Recommendation 1.
7 Money Laundering Regulations 2007, SI 2007/2157, Regulation 14(5).
8 FATF Guidance, Politically Exposed Persons (Paris 2013) p 3.
9 Ibid.
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FATF Recommendation 22(d) states that the CDD and EDD requirements 
‘apply to lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants – 
when they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the 
following activities:
• buying and selling of real estate; …
• creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and 
buying and selling of business entities’.10
The reporting of suspicious transactions is a further part of the AML require-
ments. FATF Recommendation 20 states that ‘if a financial institution suspects or 
has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activ-
ity … it should [must]11 be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions to 
the financial intelligence unit (FIU)’.12 This also applies to DNFBPs and hence 
legal practitioners. This responsibility is emphasised in FATF Recommendation 
23(a) which states that ‘Lawyers, notaries and other independent legal profession-
als should [must] be required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of 
or for a client, they engage in a financial transaction in relation to activities 
described in paragraph (d) of Recommendation 22’13 (noted above).
At the time of the time of the proposed transaction in the Sharif case, the 
FATF requirements were contained in the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 
(the ML Regulations) and as regards solicitors, the Solicitors Regulation Authority 
(SRA) Code of Conduct 2011 and SRA Principles 2011 applied.
THE SHARIF CASE
Khalid Sharif was a partner in Child & Child, a London-based firm of solicitors 
whose specialist practice area was property law. He dealt with the sale and 
purchase of some of the most expensive properties in London. The firm’s client 
base included a number of high-net worth foreign nationals. Among them were 
Leyla and Arzu Aliyeva (the sisters) who were the daughters of Ilham Aliyev, the 
President of Azerbaijan.14 These were new clients with whom the firm had had no 
10 FATF Recommendation 22(d) (n 5).
11 ‘For the purposes of assessing compliance with the FATF Recommendations, the word 
should has the same meaning as must’. FATF Recommendations Glossary, emphasis in 
the original.
12 FATF Recommendation 20 (n 5).
13 Ibid. Recommendation 23.
14 They are referred to as ‘X’ in the ruling. Their identity was revealed in the national 
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direct contact but who were introduced via an intermediary, Javed Marandi, who 
was an existing client of the firm.15 Given their status, both sisters were foreign 
PEPs and therefore any business transactions undertaken on their behalf required 
Mr Sharif to undertake enhanced due diligence. The sisters wished to purchase 
two flats in Knightsbridge, London for £59.5 million. To enable them to do so, Mr 
Sharif instructed Mossack Fonseca to incorporate a company in the British Virgin 
Islands (BVI). In January 2015, Exaltation Ltd16 was duly incorporated there with 
the sisters being listed as the beneficial owners.17 Exaltation Ltd was the intended 
purchaser of the Knightsbridge properties.18 Mr Sharif was also the firm’s money 
laundering reporting officer (MLRO). He signed the relevant CDD form in which 
he confirmed that normal CDD measures had been applied to the proposed trans-
action and also confirmed on the appropriate form that the sisters were not PEPs.
At the tribunal, Mr Sharif faced several allegations concerning his failure to 
comply with the relevant AML requirements and that accordingly he had ‘failed to 
behave in a way that maintained the trust the public place in him and in the 
provision of legal services’19 in breach of Principle 6 of the SRA Principles 2011.
The first allegation was that he had failed to take any or any adequate steps to 
ascertain the status of the sisters as required by the ML Regulations. At the 
tribunal he did not dispute that his clients were PEPs and admitted that that his 
failure to undertake adequate checks was a ‘clear omission’.20 The Tribunal found 
the allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt.
press: see, for example, Luke Harding, ‘Azerbaijan Leader’s Daughters Tried to Buy £60m 
London Home with Offshore Funds’ (The Guardian, 21 December 2018) <https://www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/21/azerbaijan-leaders-daughters-tried-to-buy-60m-
london-home-with-offshore-funds> accessed 10 June 2019.
15 Referred to in the Tribunal ruling as Y. Mr Marandi was a close associate of the 
President of Azerbaijan and therefore, himself a PEP: reported in The Guardian, Ibid.
16 The company is referred to as ‘E’ in the ruling.
17 The link is revealed in the Panama Papers: see Offshore Leaks Database, ‘Leyla Ilham 
Qizi Aliyeva’ (Offshore Leaks Database, 2019) <https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/
nodes/12119990> accessed 10 June 2019. There is no suggestion in any of the 
documentation that the purchase monies were the proceeds of crime or that Mr Sharif was 
knowingly involved in way with money laundering.
18 After the exchange of contracts on the properties, the sisters reportedly started to pay 
the purchase price in instalments. They had transferred over £14.3 million before the 
Panama Papers revelations in 2016. This led to the sale ‘unravelling’ after their identity 
was revealed: see Luke Harding, ‘Azerbaijan Leader’s Daughters Tried to Buy £60m 
London Home with Offshore Funds’ (n 15).
19 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharif (n 3) para 13.6.
20 Ibid., para 13.5.
LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AS POTENTIAL MONEY LAUNDERERS:  
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY AND PEPs
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
193
A second allegation was that he had failed to apply enhanced CDD in respect 
of the sisters and had thus failed to ‘maintain the trust the public placed in him 
and in the provision of legal services’.21 Mr Sharif admitted that he had failed to 
take adequate steps to do so, including by way of making appropriate Internet 
searches.22 The Tribunal found the allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt.
A third allegation was that he had ‘failed to take any or any adequate steps to 
confirm his client’s instructions in that he had accepted instructions from Y [Javed 
Marandi]’23 and that ‘his actions would not maintain the trust that the public 
placed in solicitors, and so the Respondent breached [SRA] Principle 6’.24 At the 
Tribunal, the Mr Sharif acknowledged that he had exchanged contracts on the 
property and transferred a considerable sum of money without confirming in 
writing with the sisters that he was authorised to act on their behalf. The Tribunal 
found the allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt.
A further allegation was that Mr Sharif had acted in circumstances which 
disclosed a significant risk that money laundering was taking place and that he had 
failed both to act with integrity and maintain the trust the public placed in the 
profession.25 It was submitted by the Applicant that the Exaltation transaction 
presented a higher risk of money laundering on account of a number of warning 
signs:
• the X clients [the sisters] were new clients with whom the firm had not met, 
spoken with or corresponded directly;
• the use of one or more intermediaries to give instructions and to provide KYC 
information;
• the very high value of the transaction;
• the use of a BVI to hold UK property for foreign nationals;
• the use of foreign bank accounts; 
• the monies used in the transaction originating from a country about which the 
respondent knew little.26
21 Ibid., para 14.
22 In practice, those seeking to launder their proceeds of crime often seek to conceal their 
identity: thus often making it extremely difficult to identify them as a PEP. In the Sharif 
case, the true identity of the sisters was known and this makes the failure of Mr Sharif to 
identify them as PEPs somewhat puzzling.
23 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharif (n 3) para 15.
24 Ibid., para 15.4.
25 This in contravention of Outcome 7.5 of the SRA Code of Conduct and Principles 6 
and 7 of the SRA Principles.
26 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharif (n 3) para 16.1.
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Mr Sharif admitted he acted in the Exaltation transaction in circumstances where 
there were grounds to suspect that money laundering may be taking place.27 The 
Tribunal found the allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt.
A further separate matter related to Mr Sharif acting for Mr Marandi who 
wished to ‘gift a London apartment to P2’.28 The purchase involved a complex 
series of transactions. The SRA alleged that the ‘flat (in an exclusive part of 
London) was owned by a corporate structure – Company A. Another corporate 
structure (Company B) was to be created of which P2 would be the ultimate 
beneficial owner. The shares in Company A would then be gifted to Company 
B’.29 The SRA submitted that this gift presented specific warning signs/risk 
factors including the fact that the property in question was a high-value gift and 
was transferred between foreign-owned entities in an offshore jurisdiction. Mr 
Sharif admitted that he had failed to conduct ongoing monitoring of his business 
relationship with Mr Marandi and therefore breached his obligation to undertake 
enhanced CDD steps. The Tribunal found the allegation proved beyond reasonable 
doubt.
The Tribunal’s Ruling
The Tribunal found that Mr Sharif was ‘wholly culpable for his misconduct’ and 
that ‘given the nature of his work, it was even more incumbent on the Respondent 
to ensure that he complied with the rules and regulatory regime to minimise the 
risk of money laundering…. The more so in that he was the firm’s [money launder-
ing reporting officer]’.30 The Tribunal also noted that there had been significant 
harm to the reputation of the profession in that Mr Sharif’s failings had led to a 
risk of large amounts of money being laundered.31 This misconduct was aggravat-
ed in that ‘he ought to have known that he was in material breach of his obligation 
to protect the public and the reputation of the profession’.32 However, mitigating 
factors, including the fact that he had cooperated with the investigation and that no 
client had suffered any loss, meant that the misconduct was not so serious as to 
27 Ibid., para 16.6.
28 Identified in the press as Mirjalal Pashayev who is a cousin of Azerbaijan’s first lady 
and Vice-President Mehriban Aliyeva. It seems to have been assumed at the Tribunal that 
she was also a PEP.
29 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharif (n 3) para 17.1.
30 Ibid., para 31.
31 Ibid., para 32.
32 Ibid., para 32.
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require his removal from practice. Mr Sharif was fined £45,000 with agreed costs 
of £40,000.
SOME COMMENTS
The Panama Papers and Beneficial Ownership Transparency
The Panama Papers leak in 2016 revealed the role of Mossack Fonseca in estab-
lishing complex offshore corporate structures for PEPs (among others), with the 
British Virgin Islands (a British Overseas Territory (BOT)) being particularly 
popular as the place of incorporation. Seemingly it was only as a consequence of 
the release of the Panama papers, that the link between the Aliyeva sisters, Exalta-
tion Ltd and Child & Child was revealed.
The Sharif case is seemingly the first in which a UK-based legal practitioner 
has been penalised as a result of the publication of the Panama Papers. It 
demonstrates the manner in which PEPs (often assisted by their legal 
representatives) use offshore companies to purchase real estate in the UK and thus 
seek to conceal their beneficial ownership of the property.33 In fact, in mitigation 
it was asserted on Mr Sharif’s behalf that ‘There was nothing uncommon about 
the use of a corporate structure for the purchase and sale of property in 
Knightsbridge; on the contrary, it was prolific’. Further, as regards the Marandi 
gift: ‘There was nothing unusual in the nature of the transaction; a transfer using 
corporate structures was the obvious way to effect the transaction’.34 The scale of 
such activity was emphasised in 2019 when Global Witness reported that ‘over 
87,000 properties in England and Wales valued at an excess of US$132.4 billion 
(£100 billion) are owned by anonymous companies registered in tax havens’.35
The Sharif case highlights the need for global action to require transparency 
in the beneficial ownership of such companies. In 2015, the UK became the first 
33 See OCCRP, ‘Report: US$132 Billion of UK Property is Registered in Tax Havens’ 
(OCCRP, 18 March 2019) <https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/9397-report-us-132-billion-of-
uk-property-is-registered-in-tax-havens> accessed 28 March 2019. See also Transparency 
International UK, Corruption on your doorstep: How corrupt capital is used to buy 
property in the UK (Transparency International UK, London 2014) <https://www.
transparency.org.uk/publications/corruption-on-your-doorstep/> accessed 10 June 2019.
34 Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharif (n 3) paras 21, 26.
35 In fact, HM Land Registry has a publicly available data of overseas companies 
ownership: see HM Land Registry, ‘HM Land Registry: Overseas Companies Ownership 
Data’ (GOV.UK, 7 November 2017) <www.gov.uk/guidance/hm-land-registry-overseas-
companies-ownership-data> accessed 2 April 2019.
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G20 country to introduce a public registry of beneficial ownership with companies 
being required to keep a register of people with ‘significant control over the 
company’.36 Given their significance as offshore ‘secrecy jurisdictions’ the 
requirement contained in the Sanctions and Money Laundering Act 2018 that 
the BVI and other BOTs introduce their own public beneficial ownership registers 
is particularly noteworthy. Indeed by 2023, all BOTs Territories will be expected 
to have public beneficial ownership registers in place ‘in line with the UK 
Government’s global campaign to make public registers the global norm by 
then’.37 It will be interesting to see whether the type of transaction undertaken in 
the Sharif case remains so prolific thereafter or whether they are simply moved to 
other secrecy jurisdictions.
Taking AML Obligations Seriously
It is important to emphasise that establishing an offshore company is entirely 
lawful, as is using a company to purchase real estate in the UK. It is the mirroring 
of such legitimate transactions by money launderers that makes the offence so 
difficult to detect and investigate. Given their role in real estate and other property 
transactions, legal practitioners remain vulnerable to facilitating money launder-
ing by their clients. The Sharif case serves as a stern reminder to all legal practi-
tioners of the need to be proactive in satisfying their AML obligations.
This point is emphasised in a 2017 Transparency International report which 
highlighted the very low number of suspicious activity reports being made by legal 
practitioners.38 This is reinforced in the 2018 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) 
Annual Report from the National Crime Agency which notes that a record number 
of 463,938 SARs were made to the UK Financial Intelligence Unit between April 
36 See Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s 81.
37 See Sir Alan Duncan’s answer to Written Question 211611 dated 23 January 2019 asked 
by Dame Margaret Hodge: Sir Alan Duncan, ‘British Overseas Territories: Companies’ 
(UK Parliament, 28 January 2019) <https://beta.parliament.uk/questions/eUPACHFA> 
accessed 10 June 2019. See further John Hatchard, ‘Money Laundering, Public Beneficial 
Ownership Registers and the British Overseas Territories: The Impact of the Sanctions 
and Money Laundering Act 2018’ (2018) 30(1) Denning Law Journal 185.
38 See Transparency International UK, ‘Don’t Look, Won’t Find: Weaknesses in the 
Supervision of the UK’s Anti-Money Laundering Rules’ (Transparency International UK, 
November 2015) <https://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/dont-look-wont-find-
weaknesses-in-the-supervision-of-the-uks-anti-money-laundering-rules/> accessed 10 
June 2019, esp pp 12–13.
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2017 and March 2018.39 However, just 2,660 (0.57%) were made by ‘independent 
legal professionals’ and this was 11.92% lower than the previous year.40 As the 
report notes, the ‘UKFIU makes no comment as to the relative volume of reports 
from different sectors. It is for the sectors and their supervisors to assess if the 
volume of SARs submitted is proportionate to the risks their sectors face’.41
Perhaps it is no coincidence that in March 2019, the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority announced that it intended to carry out spot checks of 400 law firms to 
ensure they were not breaching their AML obligations and warned that firms 
would face an enforcement process and significant penalties if they had failed to 
do so.42
CONCLUSION
The Sharif case highlights the vulnerability of legal practitioners to involvement 
in money laundering and the crucial importance that they satisfy all their AML 
responsibilities with a failure to do so leading to serious consequences. Further, 
given the limited number of suspicious activity reports being made by legal prac-
titioners to the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, the case may well provide a 
wake-up call for other practitioners to take effective steps to fulfil their AML 
obligations.
While there was no suggestion of any attempt to launder the proceeds of crime 
in the Sharif case, it also highlights the manner in which companies incorporated 
in offshore jurisdictions are used to conceal beneficial ownership and the risk that 
these can be used to facilitate money laundering. This highlights the importance 
of the developing strategies requiring all states to adopt public beneficial ownership 
registers. Here the ongoing work of the UK Government is commendable.
39 National Crime Agency, ‘Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2018’ 
(National Crime Agency, 2018) <https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/
publications/256-2018-sars-annual-report/file> accessed 10 June 2019, p 2.
40 Ibid., p 6.
41 Transparency International UK (n 38) p 6.
42 The Times, ‘Firms face random money laundering checks’ (The Times, 20 March 2019) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/firms-face-random-money-laundering-checks-
qqssfnlqr> accessed 10 June 2019.
